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ABSTRACT 
Culture is considered as one of the most powerful forces that shape human behaviour and 
thereby economic activity. This paper investigates the effects of culture on labour 
productivity and examines the cultural traits driving this relationship. Using panel data 
analysis, empirical evidence is provided covering a sample of 34 OECD countries over a 
wide period of three decades. Our empirical results suggest a significant positive relationship 
between the cultural background and labour productivity. The main channels of this positive 
impact are control and work ethic environment, while obedience has a negative impact on 
productivity. These findings are robust to a series of robustness checks, including alternative 
cultural measures, additional control variables, various country samples, and alternative 
specifications. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Productivity is one of the most important determinants of economic growth; it is the main 
explanation of why middle-income countries fail to evolve into advanced economies, since 
these economies face sharp slowdowns in productivity (Agénor et al., 2015). Almost in 85% 
of the cases where the rate of output growth has slowed down in an economy can be 
explained by the slump of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth and not by a decline in 
capital accumulation growth (Eichengreen et al., 2012). 
Many low-income countries are characterized by significant low levels of productivity 
(Petrakis, 2014). Hence, the prospect for improvement for these economies is high, providing 
them with the opportunity to boost their productivity to higher levels. After a low-income 
economy is transformed into a middle-income country, it will face various new challenges. 
Improvement of institutional efficiency will help in reducing uncertainty, freeing resources 
for the production process and providing incentives for entrepreneurial activity. However, the 
role of cultural background is extremely important as well. Several authors have 
distinguished the influence of the cultural background of a society on its economic outcomes 
from that of institutions (Guiso et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2008; 2010 among others). Culture, 
thus, continues to play a direct role even for those economies that are characterized by 
sophisticated formal institutions (Guiso et al., 2015).  
The connection between culture and economic outcomes is not a new question 
(Acemoglu, 2009; Economides and Egger, 2009; De Jong, 2011). Montesquieu (1989 
[1748]), Machiavelli (1987 [1519]) and Marshall (1997 [1890]) made references to the 
general circumstances of the environment that can have an impact on attitude and human 
conventions (Petrakis and Kostis, 2013). Weber (1958 [1904]) and Harrison and Huntington 
(2000) stressed the role of religion, while Putnam (1993) broadened the meaning of cultural 
factors and trust as he relates them to the concept of social capital. Gasper (1996) points out 
that works on culture and development valuably stress the importance of cultural differences 
within societies, while, more recently, Guiso et al. (2015) show that culture plays a 
significant role in explaining persistent differences in the economic success or failure of 
nations. Moreover, culture is found to determine the levels of self-employment (Marcén, 
2014), the size of government (Pham et al., 2018), and also to influence SME profitability 
(Gaganis et al., 2019), stock markets (Zhou et al., 2019) as well as the market share of foreign 
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banks (Xue and Cheng, 2013). Thus, economic literature provides clear evidence that culture 
can be seen as a powerful force shaping human economic behaviour (Throsby, 2001). 
The relationship between culture and productivity, at a national level, has not been 
explored widely in the literature, although there are some relevant contributions - mainly in 
the micro-level (Leibenstein, 1982; Kreps, 1990; Goncalo and Staw, 2006). The literature on 
the effects of culture at the microeconomic level, lies on organizational culture and labour 
productivity within firms. There is a general consensus that organizational culture has a 
significant influence on productivity (Mathew, 2007), while other works contend that culture 
does not determine productivity - actions do (Martinez et al., 2015). Kreps (1990) and Siehl 
and Martin (1990) provide explicit connection of productivity with organizational culture. 
Leibenstein (1982) suggests that productivity within a firm might be determined by the 
‘effort convention’ that the firm and its workers adopt, in terms of the firm’s or the workers’ 
behaviours. In addition, there are organizations recorded that have adopted collectivist values 
in order to promote productivity (Goncalo and Staw, 2006). Furthermore, Fenton-O’Creevy 
(1998) and Ciavarella (2003) argue that there is a connection between workers’ behaviour 
(that is determined by the workers’ cultural background) in an organization and their 
productivity level. Higher involvement in the organization, leads to attachment with the 
organization and higher motivation and consequently to higher levels of productivity. Many 
authors record a contagious character to worker productivity (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and 
Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010; De Grip and Sauermann, 2012). Specifically, there is a 
significant effect between peers; when the workers of a unit are productive a new worker 
getting in the unit will become also productive. Additionally, there are many studies that 
associate productivity with organizational climate, since the concepts of climate and culture 
are often argued to be used interchangeably, although organizational culture is argued to 
represent the deeper and more fundamental aspects of organizational life (Denison, 1996). 
For instance, Kopelman et al. (1990) argue that organizations that are characterized by an 
environment with special emphasis on rewards, will have enhanced clarity in outcome 
expectations, and therefore to enhanced productivity. Also, Patterson et al. (2004) suggest 
that concern for employee welfare would lead to satisfaction and thus to increased 
productivity. 
In addition, several studies exist that examine the relationship between specific cultural 
values and productivity (see Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Erez and Somech, 1996; Cox et 
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al., 2011; Bjornskov and Meon, 2015; Fang et al., 2016; Ramos and Paiva, 2017).1 More 
precisely, Cox et al. (2011) found that individualism is positively correlated with productivity 
while power distance is negatively correlated. Erez and Somech (1996) argue that familiarity 
and communication between group members, setting stretch goals and performance-based 
incentive schemes may be identified as factors that would minimize group productivity loss. 
Fang et al. (2016) state that long term orientation is a significant predictor of student 
achievement, creativity, and productivity. Ramos and Paiva (2017), more recently, point that 
honesty in duty displays dedication and dedication increases productivity. Furthermore, an 
alternative explanation on the connection between culture and productivity is through the 
effects of trust levels in a society, since trust can be regarded as a cultural value of societies 
(Putnam, 1993; Stivers, 1994; Fukuyama, 1995). Several articles in the literature explore the 
connection of trust with productivity (Knack and Keefer 1997, Bjornskov and Meon 2015). 
Higher levels of trust lead to riskier (Bjornskov and Meon, 2015), and larger (Dearmon and 
Grier, 2009) investments, leading in turn to higher levels of productivity. In addition, La 
Porta et al. (1997) point out that social trust allows for the realization of shorter contracts, 
leading to productivity gains. Kaasa (2016), on the other side, shows that institutional trust 
and civic participation, and not general trust, are the most significant factors for productivity 
at the regional level for Europe. 
The scope of this paper is to examine the impact of culture on labour productivity and to 
identify the main channels driving this relationship at the macro-level. To do so, we use a 
panel research design, for the first time in the literature, and employ data over a long period 
of three decades (80’s, 90’s and 00’s), providing empirical evidence based on the analysis of 
a sample of 34 OECD countries. In this way, we first explore the impact of cultural change 
on labour productivity, using a broader definition of the cultural background, and second, 
examine the cultural traits driving this relationship. 
We contribute to the literature by taking into account various challenges. Several authors 
show that cultural background of a society is expected to change slowly (Johnston, 1996; De 
Jong, 2009; Schwartz, 2009; Alesina et al., 2013; Petrakis and Kostis, 2013), however there is 
still a significant variation over time and across countries (Paldam, 2007; Roth, 2009; De 
Jong, 2011). To account for this changing behaviour of culture we exploit the panel 
                                                          
1 Most of these empirical works study the effects of culture on productivity, using a cross-section 
research design and considering the cultural traits as being virtually stable over time. This is the 
reason why these studies employ a static conception of cultural background, e.g. using the Hofstede’s 
(1980, 2010) cultural dimensions, the GLOBE study (House et al., 2004), or questionnaires for 
specific case studies. 
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dimension of the data and use a period of three decades for a sample of OECD member 
countries. Thus, the principal contribution of our study is to present an analysis of a 
prolonged period of data on cultural background and labour productivity over the last three 
decades, extending the previous restrictive cross-section analyses into a richer panel data 
context.2 Furthermore, the measurement of culture is found to be rather difficult and prone to 
measurement error. In this paper, a broader measure of culture is used (Tabellini, 2010; 
Bützer et al., 2013; Kyriacou and López, 2015), which differentiates this work from other 
studies in the literature that use some distinct aspects of culture to examine their impact on 
productivity, like organizational culture (Siehl and Martin, 1990), collectivism (Erez and 
Somech, 1996; Goncalo and Staw, 2006), organizational climate (Denison, 1996) and trust 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997; Bjornskov and Meon, 2015). Adding to this, we also investigate 
the potential channels of the impact of culture that have been proposed in the literature 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997; Guiso et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2010; Bützer et al., 2013). Moreover, 
this paper differs from previous works since we investigate the cultural effects on labour 
productivity, and not on a more general concept of productivity, as labour productivity is 
found to be the most widely used measure of productivity in the literature (Knack and Keefer, 
1997; Hall and Jones, 1999).  
Our results show strong evidence of a positive effect of culture on labour productivity. 
The main channels of this positive association are the control and work ethic environment 
while obedience seems to have a negative impact on productivity. Our findings are robust to a 
series of robustness checks, including alternative cultural aspects, additional control 
variables, various country samples, and alternative specifications.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the estimation strategy and 
the data used in the analysis, while Section 3 presents the empirical results and provides 
robustness checks. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Roth (2009), for example, shows the advantages of the use of a panel research design instead of a 
cross-section research design for the empirical analysis of the relationship between trust and economic 
performance, while, De Jong (2011) suggests that a more systematic approach, to overcome the 
limitations of a cross-section approach, is needed to investigate the relationship for various countries 
over a long period. 
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2. ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
In order to explore the relationship between culture and labour productivity at the macro-
level, we use an unbalanced panel of decade-level data for OECD countries over a period of 
three decades (80’s, 90’s and 00’s). The choice of the final sample of countries as well as the 
time period under investigation is determined by the availability of the data on labour 
productivity and the cultural variables. We ended up with an unbalanced panel of 34 OECD 
countries over 3 decades of data for the empirical analysis.3  
To examine the effects of culture on labour productivity we estimate variations of the 
following empirical specification: 
 
𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,                                             (1) 
 
where i denotes the OECD country (with Nmax = 34) and t the decade (with Tmax = 3). The 
dependent variable lpr is a measure for labour productivity, culture is a measure of the 
cultural background, Z is a vector of macroeconomic and institutional control variables, αi is 
a set of country-specific fixed effects capturing the influence of unobserved country-specific 
time-invariant heterogeneity, and finally, λt is a set of time dummies, for each decade in the 
sample, which control for decade-specific effects that are common to all countries.4 
The analysis of Equation (1) is based on standard panel data estimation methods. We 
employ the fixed effects (FE) estimation approach which allows for individual heterogeneity 
using different intercepts across countries and can be estimated using the ordinary least 
square method. In addition, we include decade time dummies to our estimation to incorporate 
time specific effects that are common to all countries in the sample. In all estimations, we 
employ a cluster-robust approach for standard errors to control for possible serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity. 
The data were drawn from a variety of sources. The cultural variables were obtained from 
Bützer et al. (2013). Specifically, the series are constructed based on survey data from the 
                                                          
3 The 34 OECD countries in our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
4 The β coefficient of the culture measure indicates the average effect of a one-standard deviation 
change in culture (equivalent to 1.38 on a scale from -3.58 to 3.41) on labour productivity growth 
(equivalent to 1.31 on a scale from -0.01 to 7.61). 
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World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS). These data are 
aggregated to decade-level data at a national level, and therefore ended up with one 
observation over three decades for each country (80’s, 90’s and 00’s, respectively). To 
measure culture, we use the ‘overall civic culture’ measure that is created as the first principal 
component of the alternative traits of a society’s civic culture (culture) and captures a broader 
conception of the social norms, beliefs and values in a society (Tabellini, 2008; 2010).5 We 
investigate also alternative channels of culture that have been proposed in the literature (see 
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Guiso et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2010; Bützer et al., 2013; among 
others), using a set of six distinct cultural variables covering the various dimensions of a 
society's civic culture such as interpersonal trust (trust), control (control), work ethic (work), 
obedience (obedience), competition affinity (competition) and honesty (honesty). 
Following Bützer et al. (2013), the alternative traits of culture that are used in our analysis 
are: 1) trust, that is defined as interpersonal trust and is the percentage of respondents in each 
country who respond that they can trust most people to the question: “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with 
people?”, 2) control, that arises as respondents’ answers to the question: “how much freedom 
of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out?”. Life control 
measures virtually the belief in individual self-determination and refers to people’s belief that 
their lives are controlled by themselves rather than by external factors, and the individual 
efforts made are likely to be rewarded. 3) The cultural dimension of work emerges as the first 
component of a PCA including: (a) those who respond ‘hard work’ to the question of what 
quality they consider particularly important to teach their children; and (b) the percentage of 
respondents they say that how they work is very important for their lives. 4) The cultural 
dimension of obedience arises as the first principal component of the percentage of mentions 
of ‘obedience’ and ‘independence’ that respondents answered to the question: “which quality 
do you consider to be especially important to teach your children?”. 5) The cultural 
dimension of competition emerges as the first component of a PCA in respondents’ answers 
to the questions: “how would you place your view on a scale from 1 to 10”, ranging from 
‘competition is good’ to ‘competition is harmful’, and ‘people can only get rich at the 
expense of others’ versus ‘wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone’. 6) Finally, the 
                                                          
5 This overall measure of culture can be viewed as an aggregate indicator of a society’s cultural 
background (Tabellini, 2010; Bützer et al., 2013; Kyriacou and López, 2015). Since this measure of 
overall culture (the first principal component) is positively correlated with four aspects of culture 
(trust, control, work and honesty) and negatively correlated with obedience and competition (see 
Table 2), we interpret it as a net measure of the traits of culture that favour labour productivity. 
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cultural dimension of honesty arises as the first component of a PCA in respondents’ answers 
to the questions: “Is it justifiable to cheat on taxes”, “avoid fare on public transport” and 
“fail to report damage you have done accidentally to a parked vehicle?”. 
The data for labour productivity are drawn from the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) productivity database and refer to the average growth 
rate of GDP per hour worked in constant prices for the respective decade for each country 
(lpr) (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999).6 Following previous studies on the 
impact of culture on the macroeconomy (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Roth, 2009; Tabellini, 
2010; Bützer et al., 2013; Bjornskov and Meon, 2015, among others), we include a number of 
macroeconomic and institutional variables as control variables. Specifically, vector Z 
includes the real gross domestic product per capita (gdp) as a measure of the level of income 
(e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997; Knack, 2002; Roth, 2009), the level of trade openness (open) 
or the KOF globalization index (kof) as a measure of openness of the economy (e.g. 
Bjornskov and Meon, 2015; Barone and Mocetti, 2016), a measure of human capital (hcap) 
(e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Roth, 2009; Tabellini, 2010), the level 
of government expenditures (gov) as well as the level of government debt (debt) as measures 
of the public sector (e.g. Bjornskov and Meon, 2015), the level of inflation (inf) and the rate 
of unemployment (un) as measures of short-run macroeconomics (e.g. Barone and Mocetti, 
2016), the quality of government (qog) as a measure of institutional quality and a measure of 
the confidence in national institutions (conf) (e.g. Tabellini, 2010; Bützer et al., 2013; 
Bjornskov and Meon, 2015; Kaasa 2016), a measure of government ideology (ideol) (e.g. 
Potrafke, 2017), and finally a measure of religiosity (relig) to control for any cultural impact 
of religion (e.g. Weber, 1958 [1904]; and Harrison and Huntington, 2000).7 The main source 
for the control variables is Bützer et al. (2013) except of the data for the unemployment rate 
that are obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) database, the trade openness data that are obtained from the Penn World Table 
(PWT) dataset, the KOF globalization index data that are obtained from the updated dataset 
of Dreher (2006), the government ideology data that are obtained from the updated dataset of 
                                                          
6 In the robustness section, we present additional results using total factor productivity (tfp) as an 
alternative proxy of productivity (Bjornskov and Meon, 2015). The data for the measure of total factor 
productivity are obtained from the Penn World Table (PWT) dataset. 
7 Following the literature (Tabellini, 2010; Bützer et al., 2013; Bjornskov and Meon, 2015; Kaasa, 
2016, among others), we include those two measures of the quality and the confidence in institutions 
to control for any potential indirect impact of culture on productivity through the channel of 
institutions, and thus, to identify the exact effect of culture on labour productivity beyond the 
influence of institutions. 
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Beck et al. (2001), and the data for the human capital measure (i.e. the average years of 
schooling) that are obtained from the Barro and Lee (2013) dataset. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analysis, while 
Table 2 provides the correlation matrix between the overall measure of culture and the six 
alternative cultural dimensions. 
 
Insert Tables 1 & 2 here 
 
We observe that the overall culture measure is positively correlated with four traits of 
culture (trust, control, work and honesty) and negatively correlated with obedience and 
competition, reaffirming the previous evidence by Tabellini (2010) and Kyriacou and López 
(2015) using cross-sectional data. 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
An initial graphical investigation of the correlation between the overall measure of culture 
with the labour productivity, as measured by the average growth rate of GDP per hour 
worked, is given in Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Figure 1 provides a first indication of the positive association between culture and labour 
productivity for the 34 OECD countries over the last three decades.8 
In extension to previous cross-country studies that explore the impact of culture on 
various macroeconomic variables, we adopt a panel approach to investigate the association of 
culture with labour productivity. Our analysis continues with the estimation of alternative 
specifications of Equation (1) for the panel of the 34 OECD countries over the last three 
decades. 
In Table 3, we provide evidence, using a baseline version of the specification of 
Equation (1), without including any control variables, on the relationship between the overall 
measure of culture - as well as the six alternative traits of the cultural background -with the 
                                                          
8 The fitted line is based on the regression model of Equation (1), including the level of GDP per 
capita as control variable and allowing for both country and year fixed effects. 
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productivity of labour, using the two-way fixed effects method allowing for both country and 
decade specific effects that capture the unobserved characteristics across countries as well as 
over time.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The results from the simple bivariate specification, reported in Table 3, show that the 
coefficient of the overall measure of culture is positive and statistically significant; 
highlighting that the cultural background of a society is associated with higher labour 
productivity growth. The estimate on overall culture (0.997) shows that a one-standard 
deviation change in culture will lead to about a one-standard deviation increase in labour 
productivity growth for the OECD countries. Our evidence is consistent with previous cross-
country studies (Bjornskov and Meon, 2015; Kaasa, 2016) on the positive association of 
social capital with productivity. The overall measure of culture captures a variety of cultural 
values or norms of a society (Guiso et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2010). To explore the impact of 
the various dimensions of a society’s civic culture on labour productivity we identify six 
distinct cultural traits, namely: interpersonal trust, control, work ethic, obedience, 
competition affinity and honesty. We observe that all cultural measures have the expected 
sign (except honesty), confirming the view of Tabellini (2010), however, only work and 
obedience are found to be statistically significant. This indicates that the main channel of the 
positive relationship of culture on productivity stems from the work ethic measure, while 
obedience affects negatively labour productivity (as expected, since obedience is strongly 
negatively correlated with the overall cultural measure).  
We continue, following the previous empirical literature (Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Tabellini, 2010; Bützer et al., 2013; Bjornskov and Meon, 2015; among others), and extend 
the regression specification between the alternative measures of culture and the productivity 
of labour by including a number of macroeconomic and institutional variables as control 
variables. Therefore, we isolate the impact of culture on labour productivity by controlling 
for several confounding factors capturing the effect of the macroeconomic environment and 
the institutional background. In Table 4 we extend the empirical setting by adding only the 
real per capita GDP (gdp) as the main control variable in our specification, while in Table 5 
we start with the parsimonious specification used in Table 4 and extend the model by 
including additional control variables proposed in the literature. 
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Insert Table 4 here 
 
The results from Table 4 clearly confirm the positive association between culture and 
productivity of labour, albeit the impact is smaller in size but remains significant, and 
demonstrate as the main channels for this link the control and the work ethic environment 
dimensions, while obedience continues its significant negative impact on productivity. The 
estimate on overall culture (0.802) - when controlling for the per capita output - shows that a 
change in culture by one-standard deviation will increase labour productivity growth by about 
4/5 of a standard deviation. 
Following the literature, and in order to explore the sensitivity of our results on the 
association between culture and labour productivity, and control for any potential indirect 
impact of culture through the macroeconomicand the institutional environment of a society 
on productivity, we proceed by including additional control variables and employing 
alternative specifications of Equation (1). Table 5 shows the results of various 
specifications, where we include vector Z, containing further control variables (besides the 
per capita output (gdp)). Specifically, we include several potential relevant macroeconomic 
and institutional variables such as the level of trade openness (open) or the KOF index of 
globalization (kof), a measure of human capital (i.e. the average years of schooling) (hcap), 
the level of government expenditures (gov), the level of government debt (debt), the inflation 
rate (inf), the unemployment rate (un), a measure of the quality of institutions (qog), a 
measure of the confidence in national institutions (conf), a measure of government ideology 
(ideol), and a measure of religiosity (relig). 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
The results from Table 5, show that the positive effect of the cultural background on 
labour productivity remains stable across different control variables and alternative 
specifications. Specifically, column 1 shows the baseline specification with only the per 
capita output as the main control variable (repeating column 1 from Table 4). Column 2-6 
augments the specification with the trade openness (or the KOF globalization index) and 
human capital as additional controls. In columns 7-8 we extend the specification by 
controlling for the impact of the public sector, while in columns 9-10 we control for the 
impact of short-run macroeconomic factors such as the inflation rate and the unemployment 
rate. In columns 11-12 and 15 we control for the impact of institutions, while in column 13 
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we control for the impact of government ideology and in column 14 for the impact of 
religion. Finally, in columns 16-19 we augment the standard specification with various 
macroeconomic and institutional factors. The coefficient of the overall measure of culture 
have the expected positive sign and is statistically significant in all alternative specifications, 
however the magnitude of the impact is found to be sensitive on the choice of the control 
variables, ranging from 0.374 (column 8) to 1.249 (column 19). Finally, the non-significance 
of both measures of the quality and the confidence in institutions suggests that culture have a 
direct effect on labour productivity that is not intermediated through the institutional 
background. This confirms previous views that culture has a direct effect on economic 
performance (e.g. Zak and Knack, 2001; Sabatini, 2008; Tabellini, 2008; 2010; among 
others) and provides new insights on a direct impact on productivity. 
Extending Table 4, we explore the impact of the alternative aspects of culture on the 
labour productivity by including to the estimation Equation (1) additional control variables 
(in addition to the level of real GDP per capita, we add the level of openness and the measure 
of human capital in the specification).9 The results are provided in Table 6. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
The results in Table 6 confirm the outcome of Table 5 and support the view that the main 
sources of the positive impact of culture on productivity comes from the control and the work 
ethic environment, while the impact of obedience remains negative and significant. The 
estimate of overall culture (0.880) shows that a positive change of the cultural background in 
an economy (by one-standard deviation) will increase labour productivity by around 0.9 of a 
standard deviation. This is significantly lower than the estimate (1.249) with the full set of 
controls (column 19 of Table 5) but is slightly higher than the estimate when controlling only 
for the level of per capita GDP (column 1 of Table 5). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Our results are robust to alternative sets of control variables. For example, we have extended the set 
of control variables by adding to our standard specification (which includes the level of real GDP per 
capita, the level of openness and the human capital measure) the measures for the quality of 
institutions and the confidence in national institutions with qualitatively similar findings. These results 
are available from the authors upon request. 
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3.1. Robustness Checks 
 
We check the robustness of our main results by employing a number of robustness tests 
regarding a) the grouping of the countries under consideration, b) the use of standardized 
measures of cultural variables, and c) the model specification.10 
We start the robustness tests by exploring the culture-productivity relationship across 
alternative country sub-samples of the data in Table 7.  
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
From Table 7 we observe that the positive link between culture and productivity is robust 
across alternative grouping of countries. Furthermore, the magnitude of the impact of culture 
on labour productivity increases when we rely on more homogeneous country samples (e.g. 
the Europe, EU and EA12 groups). This is an indication that countries with similar cultural 
characteristics display higher productivity growth, confirming the view of Zak and Knack 
(2001) that more homogeneous societies exhibit higher trust, and thereby higher levels of 
investment and growth. 
We next continue, by replicating Table 6 and exploring the impact of the alternative 
measures of culture on labour productivity using the standardized measures of the cultural 
variables (which account for differences in the variance) as discussed in Bützer et al. (2013) 
(Table 8). The results confirm the outcome of Table 6 and show that the choice of the 
cultural measure (standardized or non-standardized) does not affect the results, reaffirming 
the findings of Bützer et al. (2013). 
 
Insert Table 8 here 
 
In addition, we explore the robustness of our results by examining alternative model 
specifications of Equation (1) (Table 9). We extend the standard panel data specification by 
employing a dynamic panel data model that includes lagged productivity as an explanatory 
variable. Specifically, along with the benchmark two-way fixed effects estimator, which 
                                                          
10 Our results are also robust to alternative estimation methods. Besides the fixed effects (FE) 
estimation, we have employed both a pooled OLS (POLS) and a random effects (RE) estimation 
method. The main findings using these alternative estimation methods remain unaltered. These results 
are available from the authors upon request. 
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controls for both country-specific and decade-specific fixed effects (column 2), we employ 
the one-way fixed effects model (i.e., including only country-specific fixed effects) (column 
1), and then we move to the dynamic panel data specifications which allow for the presence 
of one lag of the dependent variable as explanatory variable (i.e., using a first order 
autoregressive setting, AR(1)). We use both the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimator as 
well as the bias corrected fixed effects (BCFE) estimation method, as suggested by Bruno 
(2005), for robustness purposes.11 From Table 9 we can confirm the robustness of the 
positive relationship between culture and labour productivity over alternative model 
specifications and estimation methods. 
 
Insert Table 9 here 
 
Finally, we examine the robustness of the previous findings by examining a different 
measure of productivity (Table 10).12 Following Bjornskov and Meon (2015), we use the 
measure of total factor productivity (tfp) as an alternative proxy of productivity in the 
economy.  
 
Insert Table 10 here 
 
From Table 10 we can confirm the robustness of the positive association between culture 
and productivity over alternative specifications and estimation methods. The correlation 
between culture and productivity (as measured by the total factor productivity) is positive and 
remains significant in most of the alternative specifications employed. The results reaffirm 
our findings of a positive relationship between the cultural background and productivity that 
remains robust to alternative measures of productivity.  
The overall evidence from our analysis shows a significant positive link between culture 
and labour productivity and corroborates with previous cross-country studies such as 
                                                          
11 The presence of lagged productivity in the specification results in a biased FE estimator when T is 
fixed. Kiviet (1995) proposes a bias corrected Fixed Effects estimator to estimate the dynamic panel 
model. Bruno (2005) extends the bias corrected FE approach and provide approximation formulas and 
a bootstrap variance covariance matrix for the corrected estimator. Specifically, the BCFE method 
used here is initialized by employing first a dynamic panel estimate (the AB-GMM estimator) and 
then employ a recursive correction of the bias of the FE estimator. We have also estimated the 
dynamic panel model using the AB-GMM estimator with similar findings. These results can be 
provided upon request. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this 
point.    
12 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.   
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Bjornskov and Meon (2015) and Kaasa (2016) on the positive relationship between social 
trust and productivity. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, the relationship between the cultural background of a society and labour 
productivity is examined. Using a panel dataset of 34 OECD countries over a period of three 
decades, and a fixed effects estimation approach, the analysis suggests a significant positive 
association between culture and labour productivity. More precisely, throughout the empirical 
analysis, a positive impact of cultural background on labour productivity is highlighted that is 
robust to a number of robustness checks. The positive link is supported by a simple 
regression between culture and labour productivity (without including any control variables) 
and remains stable after using GDP per capita as the main control variable, as well as when 
adding various macroeconomic and institutional factors as further control variables. In 
addition, the positive nexus is confirmed across alternative country groupings, when using the 
standardized measures for the cultural variables, or when using alternative proxies for 
productivity. Finally, the results are robust when employing alternative specification forms, 
including a dynamic panel model, along with the benchmark fixed effects model. 
The main channels for the positive association between culture and labour productivity, 
are the control and work ethic environment, while obedience seems to have a negative effect 
on labour productivity. These results show that labour productivity is higher in societies in 
which a) there is a belief in individual self-determination, referring to individuals’ conviction 
that their life is primarily controlled by themselves rather than by exogenous factors and that 
individual effort is likely to pay off, b) hard work is very important for individuals and 
especially important as a value to be taught to their children, c) individuals deal relatively 
more often with strangers and more often with friends or members of their family, and d) 
independence is assumed to be considered as an especially important value to be taught to the 
children. 
On policy grounds, the conclusions derived throughout the analysis can be used from 
policy makers which need to confront issues that arise when cultural values in the societies 
impede productivity growth. For instance, policy makers can enhance the freedom of choice 
and control how people feel about their life turns out (control of life), through developing a 
16 
 
safer environment, since this is a strong motivation in order to work harder, to innovate and 
to undertake new economic initiatives (Tabellini, 2010). Furthermore, policy makers and 
business managers should be concentrated to create a better business environment, that will 
provide more incentives to firms, in which the intrinsic motivation to work (work ethic) will 
be higher. Lastly, independence of the members in the society needs to be increased, although 
a certain level of obedience is necessary for the acceptance of decisions taken and a better 
function in the working procedures through cooperation.  
Having certified a strong and significant positive relationship between the cultural 
background and productivity, it is reasonable to think about whether the productivity 
slowdown that is observed over the past two decades in the western world (Gordon, 2012; 
Eichengreen et al., 2017) may be attributed to the change of key cultural background 
variables. Thus, a proposal for future research could be related to the fact that a) globalization 
and its consequences (population movements, unequal distribution of income, social mobility 
retardation), and b) population aging, may be regarded as major reasons for an adverse 
change in cultural values that promote productivity, such as the production of uncertainty 
avoidance behaviour, reduced social trust level, etc. The simultaneous operation of these 
factors, as well as the simultaneous operation of other factors (such as the financial 
consequences of the Great Recession) may lead to a negative cultural impact on productivity. 
Future research could therefore examine whether these factors are responsible for stimulating 
the productivity slowdown in OECD economies.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max Obs 
culture 0.223 1.376 -3.577 3.414 84 
trust 3.490 1.405 0.884 7.016 86 
control 6.928 0.595 5.080 8.012 84 
work -0.069 1.023 -2.188 1.932 86 
obedience -0.240 1.019 -2.344 1.581 86 
competition -0.079 0.907 -1.966 2.742 67 
honesty -0.021 1.213 -5.441 1.770 86 
lpr 2.091 1.313 -0.014 7.611 83 
tfp 0.942 0.091 0.664 1.191 98 
gdp 9.973 0.514 8.446 11.189 99 
open 4.199 0.524 2.919 5.663 98 
kof 4.280 0.158 3.849 4.487 98 
hcap 2.870 0.357 1.781 3.573 100 
gov 2.947 0.206 2.431 3.290 53 
debt 0.536 0.298 0.054 1.634 83 
inf 1.744 0.752 -0.323 3.904 98 
un 1.804 0.638 -0.803 2.956 98 
qog 0.831 0.153 0.476 1.000 91 
conf 0.187 1.056 -1.895 4.495 67 
ideol 1.955 0.670 1.000 3.000 95 
relig -0.397 1.049 -2.532 1.627 86 
Notes: Summary statistics for the unbalanced sample, based on Nmax = 34 countries and 
Tmax = 3 decades. The abbreviations stand for the following: lpr: labour productivity 
growth, tfp: total factor productivity growth, gdp: real GDP per capita, open: the level of 
trade openness, kof: the KOF globalization index, hcap: human capital measure, gov: the 
level of government expenditures, debt: the level of government debt, inf: inflation rate, 
un: rate of unemployment, qog: institutional quality, conf: confidence in national 
institutions, ideol: government ideology, and relig: measure of religiosity. All cultural 
variables are non-standardized and are defined in the data section. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Culture and Alternative Dimensions of Culture 
 culture trust control work obedience competition honesty 
culture 1.000       
trust 0.666 1.000      
control 0.553 0.463 1.000     
work 0.744 0.183 0.261 1.000    
obedience -0.819 -0.441 -0.160 -0.584 1.000   
competition -0.422 -0.271 -0.327 -0.451 0.111 1.000  
honesty 0.371 0.459 0.166 0.096 -0.188 -0.510 1.000 
Notes: Correlations for the unbalanced sample, based on Nmax = 34 countries and Tmax = 3 decades. Culture is 
constructed as the first principal component of the alternative cultural variables. All cultural variables are non-
standardized. 
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Table 3. Culture and Labour Productivity (Alternative Dimensions of Culture) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
culture 0.997** 
(2.99) 
      
trust  0.064      
 (0.21)      
control   1.232     
   (1.36)     
work    1.186** 
(3.34) 
   
obedience     -0.882** 
(-2.54) 
  
competition      0.141  
      (0.46)  
honesty       -0.089 
       (-0.26) 
Obs 74 76 74 76 76 59 76 
R2 0.503 0.375 0.428 0.468 0.467 0.401 0.377 
N 33 34 33 34 34 34 34 
T 2.242 2.235 2.242 2.235 2.235 1.735 2.235 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denotes significance at the 10 per cent and 5 per 
cent significance levels, respectively. All estimations were carried out using the Fixed Effects 
method allowing for both country and decade specific effects with cluster-robust standard 
errors. 
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Table 4. Culture and Labour Productivity (Alternative Dimensions of Culture)  
– Including the log of Real GDP per Capita as Control Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
culture 0.802** 
(2.18) 
      
trust  -0.190 
(-0.85) 
     
control   1.528** 
(2.26) 
    
work    0.821** 
(2.13) 
   
obedience     -0.635** 
(-2.05) 
  
competition      0.203 
(0.72) 
 
honesty       0.013 
(0.04) 
gdp -2.015** 
(-2.21) 
-2.985** 
(-3.56) 
-3.212** 
(-3.86) 
-2.113** 
(-2.34) 
-2.174** 
(-3.72) 
-4.319** 
(-2.65) 
-2.809** 
(-3.37) 
Obs 74 76 74 76 76 59 76 
R2 0.554 0.487 0.568 0.520 0.525 0.512 0.482 
N 33 34 33 34 34 34 34 
T 2.242 2.235 2.242 2.235 2.235 1.735 2.235 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denotes significance at the 10 per cent and 5 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. All estimations were carried out using the Fixed Effects 
method allowing for both country and decade specific effects with cluster-robust standard 
errors. 
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Table 5. Culture and Labour Productivity (Robustness over Control Variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
culture 0.802** 0.949** 0.802** 0.741* 0.880** 0.732* 1.045* 0.374* 0.900** 0.879** 0.999** 1.087** 0.841** 0.912** 1.079** 0.865** 1.018** 1.166** 1.249** 
 (2.18) (3.65) (2.16) (1.90) (3.21) (1.87) (1.97) (1.72) (3.21) (2.98) (2.67) (2.53) (4.23) (3.12) (2.56) (2.69) (2.59) (2.56) (3.00) 
gdp -2.015** -1.878** -2.128 -2.069** -1.937** -2.295* -1.384 -4.288** -2.030** -1.932** -1.822 -0.001 -2.387** -1.775** 0.969 -1.937** -1.868 -0.484 -1.782 
 (-2.21) (-2.19) (-1.66) (-2.51) (-2.40) (-1.95) (-1.14) (-2.70) (-2.30) (-2.54) (-0.90) (-0.00) (-2.97) (-2.61) (0.49) (-2.56) (-0.87) (-0.14) (-0.52) 
open  3.427**   3.577**  4.223** 2.834** 3.719** 3.577** 2.542* 3.378** 3.393** 3.663** 3.627** 3.758** 2.712* 3.704** 3.160* 
  (2.53)   (3.10)  (3.38) (3.61) (3.16) (3.07) (1.75) (2.54) (3.36) (3.10) (2.33) (3.21) (1.76) (2.17) (1.92) 
kof   0.800   1.558              
   (0.25)   (0.49)              
hcap    -1.012 -1.243* -1.147 -2.563 -1.988** -1.268* -1.246* -1.088 -1.410 -1.360** -1.378** -1.480 -1.346* -0.988 -1.277 -0.828 
    (-1.28) (-1.91) (-1.33) (-1.44) (-2.95) (-1.82) (-1.93) (-0.95) (-1.25) (-2.12) (-2.07) (-1.33) (-1.86) (-0.88) (-1.11) (-0.59) 
gov       1.204             
       (0.38)             
debt        -1.578**            
        (-2.61)            
inf         0.211       0.278 0.187 0.195 0.152 
         (0.82)       (0.80) (0.50) (0.41) (0.32) 
un          0.006      0.152 0.003 -0.239 -0.514 
          (0.02)      (0.36) (0.01) (-0.45) (-0.75) 
qog           0.833    -2.120  0.795 -0.454 1.378 
           (0.25)    (-0.59)  (0.24) (-0.10) (0.29) 
conf            -0.024   -0.015   -0.037 -0.083 
            (-0.12)   (-0.08)   (-0.21) (-0.44) 
ideol             0.347**      0.091 
             (2.10)      (0.42) 
relig              -0.359     0.799 
              (-0.64)     (0.80) 
Obs 74 74 74 74 74 74 47 68 74 74 67 55 72 74 55 74 67 55 53 
R2 0.554 0.641 0.555 0.568 0.662 0.572 0.708 0.722 0.666 0.662 0.602 0.637 0.696 0.668 0.642 0.667 0.605 0.653 0.688 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 26 33 33 33 31 26 32 33 26 33 31 26 25 
T 2.242 2.242 2.242 2.242 2.242 2.242 1.808 2.061 2.242 2.242 2.161 2.115 2.250 2.242 2.115 2.242 2.161 2.115 2.120 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denotes significance at the 10 per cent and 5 per cent significance levels, respectively. All estimations were carried out using the Fixed Effects method 
allowing for both country and decade specific effects with cluster-robust standard errors. 
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Table 6. Culture and Labour Productivity (Alternative Dimensions of Culture) 
 – Including Additional Control Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
culture 0.880** 
(3.21) 
      
trust  -0.147 
(-0.60) 
     
control   1.629** 
(3.31) 
    
work    0.834** 
(2.17) 
   
obedience     -0.727** 
(-2.31) 
  
competition      0.144 
(0.59) 
 
honesty       0.058 
(0.21) 
gdp -1.937** 
(-2.40) 
-2.923** 
(-3.08) 
-3.236** 
(-4.10) 
-2.082** 
(-2.08) 
-2.062** 
(-4.06) 
-4.229** 
(-2.43) 
-2.820** 
(-3.10) 
open 3.577** 
(3.10) 
2.896** 
(2.57) 
3.479** 
(3.97) 
3.251** 
(3.06) 
3.453** 
(3.16) 
1.971 
(0.96) 
3.031** 
(2.65) 
hcap -1.243* 
(-1.91) 
-1.722** 
(-3.32) 
-1.348** 
(-2.04) 
-1.287** 
(-2.23) 
-1.385** 
(-2.55) 
-1.053 
(-0.58) 
-1.664** 
(-2.71) 
Obs 74 76 74 76 76 59 76 
R2 0.662 0.580 0.674 0.614 0.630 0.534 0.578 
N 33 34 33 34 34 34 34 
T 2.242 2.235 2.242 2.235 2.235 1.735 2.235 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denotes significance at the 10 per cent and 5 per 
cent significance levels, respectively. All estimations were carried out using the Fixed Effects 
method allowing for both country and decade specific effects with cluster-robust standard 
errors. 
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Table 7. Culture and Labour Productivity (Alternative Country Samples) 
  (1) 
 Full 
 (2) 
OECD24 
 (3) 
Europe 
 (4) 
 EU 
 (5) 
 EA12 
culture 0.880** 
(3.21) 
0.887** 
(3.00) 
1.000** 
(3.09) 
1.224** 
(3.57) 
1.053** 
(2.26) 
gdp -1.937** 
(-2.40) 
-1.881 
(-1.14) 
-1.758 
(-0.87) 
1.653 
(1.45) 
1.148 
(0.72) 
open 3.577** 
(3.10) 
3.650** 
(3.16) 
3.742** 
 (2.14) 
0.244 
(0.15) 
0.457 
(0.25) 
hcap -1.243* 
(-1.91) 
-1.277* 
(-1.78) 
-1.111 
(-1.23) 
-0.097 
(-0.14) 
-0.596 
(-0.64) 
Obs 74 62 54 44 31 
R2 0.662 0.620 0.652 0.839 0.860 
N 33 24 25 21 12 
T 2.242 2.583 2.160 2.095 2.583 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denotes significance at the 
10 per cent and 5 per cent significance levels, respectively. All 
estimations were carried out using the Fixed Effects method allowing 
for both country and decade specific effects with cluster-robust 
standard errors. 
  
29 
 
Table 8. Culture and Labour Productivity (Alternative Dimensions of Culture)  
– Including Additional Control Variables and Using Standardized Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
culture 1.165** 
(3.21) 
      
trust  -0.210 
(-0.60) 
 
     
control  1.132** 
(3.31) 
    
work    0.763** 
(2.17) 
   
obedience     -0.868** 
(-2.31) 
  
competition      0.133 
(0.59) 
 
honesty       0.068 
(0.21) 
gdp -1.937** 
(-2.40) 
-2.923** 
(-3.08) 
-3.236** 
(-4.10) 
-2.082** 
(-2.08) 
-2.062** 
(-4.06) 
-4.229** 
(-2.43) 
-2.820** 
(-3.10) 
open 3.577** 
(3.10) 
2.896** 
(2.57) 
3.479** 
(3.97) 
3.251** 
(3.06) 
3.453** 
(3.16) 
1.971 
(0.96) 
3.031** 
(2.65) 
hcap -1.243* 
(-1.91) 
-1.722** 
(-3.32) 
-1.348** 
(-2.04) 
-1.287** 
(-2.23) 
-1.385** 
(-2.55) 
-1.053 
(-0.58) 
-1.664** 
(-2.71) 
Obs 74 76 74 76 76 59 76 
R2 0.662 0.580 0.674 0.614 0.630 0.534 0.578 
N 33 34 33 34 34 34 34 
T 2.242 2.235 2.242 2.235 2.235 1.735 2.235 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denotes significance at the 10 per cent and 5 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. All estimations were carried out using the Fixed Effects 
method allowing for both country and decade specific effects with cluster-robust standard 
errors. 
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Table 9. Culture and Labour Productivity (Robustness over 
Alternative Specifications) 
 (1) 
FE 
(2) 
FE 
  (3) 
 DFE 
(4) 
BCFE 
(5) 
 FE 
(6) 
DFE 
(7) 
BCFE 
        culture 0.356** 0.802** 1.184** 1.294** 0.880**  1.162**  1.239** 
 (2.82) (2.18) (3.23) (2.62) (3.21) (2.70) (2.32) 
gdp -3.414** -2.015** -1.023 -1.046 -1.937** -1.113 -1.155 
 (-6.74) (-2.21) (-0.55) (-0.57) (-2.40) (-0.56) (-0.58) 
open     3.577**   0.213   1.398 
       (3.10)  (0.10)  (0.61) 
hcap      -1.243*  -1.016  -0.593 
      (-1.91)  (-0.62)  (-0.25) 
lprt-1   -0.320** -0.064  -0.337** -0.016 
   (-2.42) (-0.28)  (-2.86) (-0.06) 
Obs 74 74 47 47 74 47 47 
R2 0.513 0.554 0.629  0.662 0.635  
N 33 33 25 25 33 25 25 
T 2.242 2.242 1.880 1.880 2.242 1.880 1.880 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denotes significance at the 10 per cent and 5 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. FE is the fixed effects, DFE is the dynamic fixed effects and 
BCFE is the bias corrected fixed effects estimator respectively. In all estimations (except column 
1 where we employ the one-way fixed effects model) we allow for both country and decade 
specific effects with cluster-robust standard errors. 
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Table 10. Culture and Productivity (Robustness using Total Factor 
Productivity as an Alternative Measure of Productivity) 
 (1) 
FE 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
BCFE 
(4) 
 FE 
(5) 
 FE 
(6) 
BCFE 
       culture 0.017** 0.029 0.474** 0.033** 0.013  0.891** 
 (2.13) (1.13) (14.64) (4.22) (0.65) (22.80) 
gdp 0.134** 0.195** -4.148** 0.230** 0.181** -6.844** 
 (2.84) (3.07) (-33.18) (8.46) (4.31) (-46.60) 
open    0.063 0.024   -0.763** 
      (1.04)   (0.33)  (-4.95) 
hcap     -0.261**  -0.293**  5.810** 
     (-4.95)  (-4.88)  (35.77) 
tfpt-1   12.702**   22.147** 
   (208.86)   (448.73) 
Obs 74 74 47 74 74 47 
R2 0.455 0.469  0.685 0.701  
N 33 33 25 33 33 25 
T 2.242 2.242 1.880 2.242 2.242 1.880 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denotes significance at the 10 per cent and 5 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. FE is the fixed effects and BCFE is the bias corrected fixed 
effects estimator respectively. In all estimations (except columns 1 and 4 where we employ the 
one-way fixed effects model) we allow for both country and decade specific effects with cluster-
robust standard errors. 
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Figure 1. Cross-Country Correlation Between Labour Productivity and Culture 
 
Notes: The graph provides an indication of the positive correlation between culture and labour 
productivity for the 34 OECD countries over the last three decades (the fitted line is based on the 
regression model of Equation (1), including the level of GDP per capita as control variable and allowing 
for country and year fixed effects). 
 
